In October 2009, the US Forces will have completed eight years in Afghanistan,since they went to war to oust the Taliban and the al Qaeda. This makes it the second longest war ,after Vietnam, in US history. This cold fact has made the Americans realize that the time has come to re-vamp their strategy in fighting the war in Afghanistan.
The United States strategic goal in Afghanistan has been the complete destruction of what has been referred to as the prime al Qaeda-the group around Osama bin Laden that organized and executed 9/11 and other attacks in Europe.And not the other group calling themselves al Qaeda, capable of operating only in the countries of their origin. There is a view that the al Qaeda prime has been considerably weakened as a result of the almost continuous attrition their forces have been subjected to not only in Afghanistan but in their hide-outs in NW Pakistan. Beside large scale destruction of its command and control set-up, it is also felt that the al Qaeda is facing difficulties in recruiting further fresh cadres to its primary unit.
However, the situation is very different with the Taliban. It may be recalled that having won the Afghan civil war after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, the Taliban had also won the support of the people.This had enabled them to build a strong infrastructure and greater resilience. After the group withdrew from Afghan cities and lost formal power post-9/11,it still retained a great deal of informal influence,if not control, over large regions of Afghanistan and in areas across the border in Pakistan. The Taliban have since regrouped ,re-armed and resumed their operations in Afghanistan. The conflict has now become a classical,conventional guerilla war.
The war in Afghanistan seems to have reached a stalemate.There have been more than 1,200 casulties,out of which 730 were Americans. Britain has lost 175 soldiers and Canada 124.The civilian casualties cannot be assessed- thousands of villagers have been killed by the Taliban and because of collateral damage by the Allied Forces. Last year alone 826 civilians were killed by air strikes. The coalition forces have been accused of “killing innocent people”, and there is understandably widespread hatred against the Americans.
President Barack Obama,who has vowed to put an end to the Afghan war,has ordered the commanders to take a fresh look at the frustrating eight-year unending war in Afghanistan, and what has stalled progress in its execution.
So the commanders are back to the drawing board and examining how the lessons learnt from Iraq and in general counterinsurgency operations, can be applied in Afghanistan. The shock-and-awe tactics,or the high tech war which was an unmitigated disaster in Iraq, and where replicated in Afghanistan, led to the alienation of the people enabling the Taliban to further entrench themselves in the countryside.
The fundamental problem in dealing with counterinsurgency is that the insurgents will avoid combat when counterinsurgency forces have an overwhelming force available. They will withdraw, disperse and either harass the main body by adopting hit-and-run tactics, or hit the counterinsurgency forces elsewhere, where they are vulnerable. These are the tactics adopted by insurgents in an asymmetrical environment when cornered. India is familiar with such tactics in Mao-infested areas and elsewhere. So are the Americans having fought in Vietnam,Iraq and Afghanistan.
The insurgents have two goals-the first is to wear out the counterinsurgency operations by engaging them in endless operations ,which have little or no tangible results; and, secondly, to impose a level of unacceptable and disproportionate casualties, making the counterinsurgency operation futile. The more time passes ,the more casualties mount for the counterinsurgents, and the more likely public support for the Americans will erode.
The insurgents will always have a tactical advantage being native to the area of operations.They will have a network of informants ,updating them in all activities of the counterinsurgents, and all operations planned. While the Americans have had the advantage of firepower,both in the air and on the ground, the Taliban have a war-winning weapon-intelligence. The Allied Forces are severely hampered by the paucity of reliable and timely intelligence.The Afghan translator,the soldier and the government official,can be possible breaches of security for the Americans ,rendering a sense of insecurity amongst the counterinsurgency forces. Since the coalition forces are operating in a foreign country,they lack the means to distinguish allies from enemy agents, and, valid from invalid information. Unless a solid base is achieved in some area of Afghanistan, and a sense of security engendered amongst the population, the intelligence problems will remain.
To get the ball rolling in a reappraisal of the operations in Afghanistan, Army General David McKiernan, who had commanded the International Security Assistance Force(ISAF),was replaced by Defence Secretary Robert Gates ,by US Army General Stanley McChrystal, saying “fresh eyes” were needed on the war. McChrystal,has had close and intimate association with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, because of his command of the Joint Special Operations Command, the secret corps of Army Delta Force and Navy Seals. This force has been regularly deployed in Afghanistan and is responsible for the killing of Abu Mousab al-Zarqawi, the al Qaeda leader in Iraq.
The first order McChrystal passed was to find more subtle ways, rather than the application of brute force tactics, in dealing with the intractable problem of Afghanistan. McChrystal has appreciated that there is more to the Afghan insurgency than just Islamic fundamentalism, there is tribal loyalties and alliances and the strategies of war-lords ,who are in no mood to abrogate their authority and power.There is also the question of lack of employment openings, which lead people to indulge in illegal activities like the opium and timber trades, which Taliban fully exploits.
McChrystal has also appreciated that the most important military action is not happening in Afghanistan ,but in Pakistan. Both countries are inextricably linked. The operations against the Taliban in Pakistan, has certainly effected the supply of arms, money, and resources to Afghanistan. The Taliban in Afghanistan can no longer find safe havens in Pakistan after hit-and-run operations. The Pakistani operations have certainly impacted on the Afghan Taliban operations. But Pakistan is objecting to the expanded American combat operations in neighbouring Afghanistan. Pakistan complains that the operations in Hemand province,currently underway, will lead to militants crossing into Pakistan, further inflaming the troubled province of Baluchistan. The ISI maintained that Pakistan does not have sufficient troops to deploy in Baluchstan to take on the Taliban, without denuding the border with India,in their two-hour briefing to the US administration.
The Americans are well aware of Mullah Muhammad Omar, with his inner circle of commanders, based in Quetta directing and guiding the war in southern Afghanistan. This Quetta shura is sheltered by the Pakistanis, who always have hoped to employ the Taliban as future allies in Afghanistan, once the coalition forces leave. It is for this reason that the ISI has been advocating that rather than recommitting additional forces and resources in southern Afghanistan, they negotiate with the Taliban
However,it is appreciated that while Pakistan’s co-operation is vital, by itself it does not make the task of bringing peace to Afghanistan any easier. Afghanistan’s current force of 86,000 troops and 82,000 are insufficient to protect the country. Even with reinforcements in the pipeline, a full-blooded counterinsurgency operation in Afghanistan may not be feasible. All that may be a possibility is the tackling of provinces piecemeal-that also with limited or no air and ground firepower.
The latest directive issued to the troops by McChrystal, enjoins them “to scrutinse and limit the use of force, like close air support amongst residential compounds,likely to produce civilian casuaties”, and that , “We will not win based on the number of Taliban we kill, but instead on our ability to separate insurgents from the people”. This policy will naturally result in more casualties(In the operations in Helmand Provice, some 15 British soldiers were killed,50 injured. The Americans, too, lost 11 soldiers, making July the highest casualty month since the Afghan War started).
Based on the new policy, some 4,000 Marines and 650 Afghan troops launched an attack on Helmand , a southern province of Afghanistan.It is here that the Taliban are largely funded by the opium trade. This is the first major offensive where the Marines used neither airpower nor artillery. It is successful, and while it may not have inflicted many casualties on the Taliban, who in classical guerilla tactics melted away to strike elsewhere, it is a first , because it is intended to stay put in the “liberated” areas, and not pull out after an operation as has been the practise earlier. Small outposts are to be established, to provide protection to the people. The troops will live near the locals, and offer protection in advance of the Presidential elections scheduled on 20 August 2009.This is basically, the strategy followed in Iraq by US General David Petraeus, now overall commander of Iraq and Afghanistan Forces, when secure zones were created in hostile territory, true to the counterinsurgency principles of winning hearts-and- minds. It is now being applied to the Helmand province, and it is to be seen if it will also be applied to other areas of Afghanistan held by the Taliban..
The probe into Helmand may be just a flash in the pan of limited strategic value, ending after the presidential elections are over. Or it may signify an intention to see the war in Afghanistan to its logical conclusion, with the ouster of the Taliban. The ultimate decision will hinge on how Obama and the American intelligence read the situation in AfPak.
Despite the low level of casualties in the Helmand operation,the reaction in the media and in Britain ,where the fact that British casualties in Afghanistan have already surpassed the number killed in Iraq, has highlighted the sensitivity of the issue.There is a general clamour for putting an end to the operations in Afghanistan amongst most participants of ISAF.
So knowing that the potent al Qaeda threat no longer exists, will the coalition forces continue their war against the Taliban ? Or will they decide that fighting a long drawn and “resource-intensive” campaign, with mounting casualties, and against political resistance, not only in America but more so amongst their allies, is not worth the effort, and call it a day ?
If Obama does abandon Afghanistan, without vanquishing the Taliban, then the Taliban, will surely take over Afghanistan -and perhaps Pakistan. After all having fought as an organization since 1990, they have a much more stake in Afghanistan than the rest of the world. They really have nowhere else to go.
Dehra Dun Lt Gen (RK Jasbir Singh)
24th July 2009
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